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Abstract
This article offers an analysis of the child’s right to be heard under Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
and its application in Norway, through a case study of bullying. The methodology combines a “top-down” legal interpreta-
tion of Article 12 in addition to an analysis of Section 9a of the Education Act, juxtaposedwith bottom-up approaches. First,
a legal analysis of Article 12 and the General Comments of the Convention on the Rights of the Child Committee is pro-
vided, with a view to demonstrating the strength of the connection between agency and voice. Looking from the bottom
up, therefore, the article then pursues the voices of the bullied children themselves. It places its ear to the ground, so to
speak, through an examination of complaints submitted by children to the Ombudsman for Children, in order to “hear” the
voices of children subjected to bullying at school, before they are formulated in legal terms before judicial bodies. Finally,
I offer a close reading of the report on Section 9a commissioned by theNorwegian Government, published in a 2015 Report
(the “Djupedal Report”) in tandem with the leading Supreme Court 2012 decision on bullying, so as to critically examine
the fulfilment of Article 12 in Norway. In the final analysis, I argue that in Norwegian bullying cases, though the child has
the legal right to be heard, there is no voice, due to the limitations of legal agency for children pursuant to Article 12 of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
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1. Who’s Afraid of the Third Optional Protocol (OP3)
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)? The
Puzzle of Norwegian Non-Ratification
A motivation for this study, and serving as its back-
ground, is the Norwegian Government’s persistent scep-
ticism and, as of 2016 (“The government will not give
children the right to appeal to the UN,” 2016), its dis-
missal of its ratification of the OP3 CRC on a communi-
cations procedure (adopted by the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly on 19 December 2011 and entered into
force 14 April 2014). Since 2010, there has been a steady
stream of civil society advocacy for the Norwegian Gov-
ernment to ratify this new Protocol, when the commu-
nications procedure made its entrance onto the domes-
tic political stage (dated from the answer by theMinister
for Foreign Affairs in Parliament to a question regarding
whether the government would assume a proactive role
in the then ongoing negotiations in the Human Rights
Council to institute an appeal mechanism to the CRC;
see Stortinget.no, 2013). In a symbolic gesture two years
later, on 24 November 2012, the succeeding ForeignMin-
ister was given pens from various youth organisations
to encourage Norway’s signature and ratification of the
new instrument that establishes a communications pro-
cedure. The domestic political landscape was coloured
by a sense of confrontation, since earlier in 2012 when
the OP3 CRC was opened up for signature, with an un-
common animosity between the Government and civil
society.When Norwaywas preparing for its presentation
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of its Universal Periodic Review Mid-term Report, it was
faced with a joint NGO platform consisting of Amnesty
International, boycotting cooperation with the Norwe-
gian authorities so as not to legitimise their report. In
addition to being “highly unusual in a Norwegian con-
text, where transparency and dialogue are important el-
ements in [Norwegian] democracy” this spelled an un-
usually unconstructive beginning for OP3 CRC, thereby
adversely affecting the deliberations. So, upon the con-
clusion of debates in Parliament on 24 November 2012,
which resulted in Parliament requesting the government
to conduct a study in the spring of 2013 highlighting
the advantages and disadvantages of ratifying the OP3
CRC, the OP3 CRC found itself in uncommonly precari-
ous political terrain in terms of children’s rights protec-
tion in Norway.
The question of ratification—at least for the
present—has been shelved by the current Norwegian
Government and the future of OP3 CRC in Norway
thus remains uncertain. The arguments against ratifi-
cation advanced by successive Norwegian governments
have been analysed from a political science perspective:
dubbed the “Nordic Paradox”, such a thesis has sought
to explain this anomaly through arguments concerning
democratic deficits and the issue of state power in the
face of international oversight of domestic mechanism.
As an example of this analysis, see (Schaffer, 2015). This
article, too, seeks to understand the paradox of Nor-
wegian scepticism to this new child rights treaty when
perhaps it has little to fear from it on the international
stage. Though it was not one of the first twenty states
that ratified the CRC, Norwegian support of the CRC is
exemplified by its incorporation of the Convention, in
addition to the recent constitutionalisation of two of its
guiding principles in Article 104 of the Norwegian Con-
stitution. In short, my analysis is spurred by the question
of how it is that a state which has a demonstrated com-
mitment to children’s rights in general, and to the CRC
in particular, can take such a negative position with re-
gard to a treaty that materialises the complaint rights of
children as part of the child’s right to be heard. Particu-
larly given that the identification and interpretation of
CRC rights by the Committee will become a source of law
in Norway, regardless of Norwegian ratification. The au-
thoritative interpretations of CRC provisions will become
the bedrock of the CRC Committee’s reasoning when it
assesses Norway’s state reports as part of its monitoring
of the CRC. From the perspective, then, of the domes-
tic protection of CRC rights, specifically Article 12 on the
right of the child to be heard, Norwegian non-ratification
makes less sense.
In attempting to make sense of the enigma of Nor-
wegian resistance to this new treaty, I employ the case of
bullying to argue along the lines, instead, that Norwegian
non-ratification of OP3 CRC is less of a paradox than it ap-
pears. Rather, I seek to argue that non-ratification makes
sense given the seemingly unshakeable nature of the le-
gal disabilities of childhood—manifested most acutely in
the blanket denial of legal agency to children. This article,
then, is not so much about rights in school as it is about
the right of the child to be heard, using bullying in Nor-
way as a springboard for discussion. In the Western legal
tradition, children have been incapable of initiating legal
proceedings except when an adult representative initi-
ates on their behalf. I frame my answer using this typol-
ogy of legal agency, understood as the ability for children
to sue in their own name. Though not a legal concept, le-
gal agency offers a useful conceptual tool through which
to avoid any confusion between the two separate legal
concepts of the capacity to have rights (“legal personal-
ity”) as opposed to the capacity to act on those rights, to
complain (“legal capacity”).
2. Introduction
I’m the monster? You’re the monster! These children
tried to warn you, but you wouldn’t listen. No one
ever listens to children! You think you’re innocent?!
You’re accomplices! This certificate says that I have
the fortune now! And there’s nothing you can do
about it! [to Violet] What do you think? Too diaboli-
cal? Give me some feedback!
This is a quote from Count Olaf from the 2004 film adap-
tation of Lemony Snicket’sA Series of Unfortunate Events
(Silberling, 2004), which speaks to the dire consequences
to life and limb of failing to hear the voices of children.
In the novel throughout, the children “speak”—including
even the intelligent toddler, who speaks but is not under-
stood by the adults who merely hear “Oots” and “Ohs”.
The children speak, but the adults fail to hear their voices
at each and every instance. By way of an ingression into
Article 12 of the CRC, when the Count asks Violet for
her opinion in the aftershock of the forced marriage,
would this satisfy the requirements of the provision? Ar-
ticle 12 reads:
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is ca-
pable of forming his or her own views the right
to express those views freely in allmatters affect-
ing the child, the views of the child being given
due weight in accordance with the age and ma-
turity of the child.
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be
provided the opportunity to be heard in any ju-
dicial and administrative proceedings affecting
the child, either directly, or through a represen-
tative or an appropriate body, in a manner con-
sistent with the procedural rules of national law.
Prima facie, Count Olaf’s request to hear Violet’s views
complies with Article 12 by offering the child a say, and
there can thus be said to be compliance. However, the
Count’s question is clearly rhetorical; indeed, it adds in-
sult to injury making it clear that the adult world is not
substantively interested in what children have to say and,
Social Inclusion, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 131–147 132
ultimately, it is the adult’s narrative that prevails. The
children speak but are very rarely heard.
The literary is not too far removed from the real. “It
doesn’t help to tell, they don’t do anything anyway” are
the chilling words that were spoken by Odin Olsen Ander-
sgård who, in 2014, was driven to taking his own life as
a result of his experience of bullying at school. Odin was
one of 63,000 children who are, according to the Norwe-
gian Institute of Public Health, said to experience bullying
at any given time in Norwegian schools. The Norwegian
Government presents children’s rights in Norway as hav-
ing the utmost importance, with an anti-bullying focus:
Norwegians consider children to be very important.
They listen to children’s views and try to include them
when making decisions….There are very strict rules
to prevent bullying at school, and just like in the UK,
all schools must have an anti-bullying plan for teach-
ers and pupils to follow. (“Norway’s official websites
abroad,” 2016)
Norway also had the first anti-bullying campaign for chil-
dren, which was instigated by students themselves (see
comments of Knut Haanes, Deputy Ombudsman for Chil-
dren in (Wakefield, 2007)). Yet, as Odin’s case demon-
strates, bullying remains a significant challenge to child
rights protection in Norway.
Norway has been a pioneer in the field of children’s
rights. It has had two members, one the Chairperson
on the Committee on the CRC. It has been said to be a
“norm entrepreneur” (Ingebritsen, 2002, p. 11) in world
politics, with Norwegians “being the first in the world
to develop social policy measures to prevent bullying in
schools” (Ingebritsen, 2006, p. 70) and Norway, being
hailed by UNICEF in 2014 as “a true champion of chil-
dren’s rights with record donation” see (”Norway proves
itself a true champion of children’s rights with record do-
nation,” 2014). Further, it was the first country in the
world to have a Children’s Commissioner. The CRC was
embedded in Norwegian law in 1991 when incorporated
in the Human Rights Act, and in its 2014 revision Arti-
cle 104 of the Norwegian Constitution was added, reflect-
ing articles 12 and3of theCRC, expressing the child’s right
to respect for their human dignity, and enshrining their
right to be heard in questions that concern them. This con-
stitutionalisation is not insignificant as, in its transforma-
tion of rights into constitutional rights, having the legal
effect that the right of the child to be heard acquires the
status of lex superior, children enjoy the highest possible
rank in the hierarchy of legal norms in the Norwegian ju-
risdiction. Further, as stated in the 2012 UNICEF Report
on the Implementation of the CRC across 12 countries, “It
is clear that Norway has a reasonably good legal frame-
work to implement children’s rights, in particular under
Articles 3 and 12 of the CRC” (Lundy, Kilkelly, Byrne, &
Kang, 2012, p. 62). However, the Report also states the
lack of measures available to ensure the enforcement of
children’s rights, and the absence of child-specific com-
plaints mechanisms is highlighted as a particular concern.
Few avenues are available to children seeking to complain
about breaches of their rights: “Whilst incorporation and
transformation had achieved good laws that were compli-
ant with the CRC, (or at least with Articles 3 and 12), en-
forcement remains weak in the absence of effective mon-
itoring, supervision and complaints mechanisms” (Lundy
et al., 2012, p. 60). Finally, though there is increased use
of the CRC in the Norwegian courts, “most litigation con-
cernsArticle 3, rather than the remainder of theCRC’s pro-
visions” (Lundy et al., 2012, p. 61).
This article offers an analysis of the child’s right to be
heard under Article 12 of the CRC and its application in
Norway, through the case study of bullying. The method-
ology combines a “top-down” legal interpretation of Ar-
ticle 12 in addition to an analysis of Section 9a of the Edu-
cation Act, juxtaposed with bottom-up approaches. First,
a legal analysis of Article 12 and the General Comments
of the CRC Committee is provided, with a view to demon-
strating the strength of the connection between agency
and voice. The article then pursues the voices of the bul-
lied children themselves. It places its ear to the ground,
so to speak, through an examination of complaints sub-
mitted by children to the Ombudsman for Children, in or-
der to “hear” the voices of children subjected to bullying
at school, before they are formulated in legal terms be-
fore judicial bodies. Finally, I offer a close reading of the
report on Section 9a commissioned by the Norwegian
Government, published in 2015 Report (the “Djupedal
Report”) in tandemwith the leading SupremeCourt 2012
decision on bullying, so as to critically examine how well
Article 12 fares in Norway. In the final analysis of the arti-
cle, I argue that though the child has the legal right to be
heard in Norwegian bullying cases, there is no voice due
to the limitations of legal agency for children pursuant to
Article 12(2) CRC.
3. Children in the Legal Process
Traditional legal assumptions,what has been termed “lib-
eral legal ideology” (Clark, 2015), have worked to deny
legal capacity to children and have meant that children
by definition and virtue of their legal status have been
rendered ineligible to participate in legal proceedings.
Otherwise referred to as the legal disabilities of child-
hood, these barriers fall short of international standards
of child rights protection, most particularly Article 12
of the CRC, which enshrines a child’s right to be heard.
Jane Fortin characterises children’s involvement in family
law proceedings as a ladder (Fortin, 2009, pp. 248–249),
evocative of Roger Hart’s ladder of young people’s partic-
ipation (Hart, 1997). The different ways of being heard
represent the ladder’s rungs: the bottom rung being no
views expressed to the court, progressing upwards to
more direct involvement through party status, and ulti-
mately to the ability to litigate on their own behalf as
the uppermost rung of the ladder. Family law scholars
Parkinson and Cashmore do not view Fortin’s ladder as
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a hierarchy of virtue, and assert instead that there can
be a smorgasbord of approaches to hearing the voices of
children in legal proceedings, informed, not least, by re-
source constraints (Parkinson & Cashmore, 2008). How-
ever, the point of the ladder is to elevate the child’s legal
involvement—it is not an end in itself, but exists as a tool
to be used as a means to children having full recognition
as rights holders before the law. Seen in this light, legal
agency—the uppermost rung—must be provided for in
order that children be elevated to their status as rights
holders, particularly in cases where the state’s legal ma-
chinery is not already engaged in family law or juvenile
justice proceedings. Bullying provides a useful example
of a case where children have reason to be complainants
in their own right, without having been drawn into the
legal system as defendants or participants in a divorce
proceeding, for example.
4. Voice and Agency: Forging the Connection
The universal right to legal agency, defined as having
both legal personality and legal capacity can be said to
be a new norm in international human rights law that is
also extended to children (Clark, 2015). Though this right
is not expressly granted in the CRC (cf. Article 12 of the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities),
the child’s right to legal agency was implicit in the exten-
sion of communication procedures to children from their
very inception in theUN system. As elucidated by the CRC
Committee (“the Committee”) in its General Comment
No. 3 on General Measures of Implementation:
For rights to have meaning, effective remedies must
be available to address violations. This requirement is
implicit in the Convention and consistently referred to
in the other international human rights treaties. Chil-
dren’s special and dependent status creates real dif-
ficulties for them in pursuing remedies for breaches
of their rights. So states need to give particular at-
tention to ensuring that there are effective, child-
sensitive procedures available to children and their
representatives. These should include the provision
of child-friendly information, advice, advocacy, includ-
ing support for self-advocacy, and access to indepen-
dent complaints procedures and to the courts with
necessary legal and other assistance. (General Com-
ment No. 5 (2003) General measures of implementa-
tion of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (arts.
4, 42 and 44, para. 6), 2003, para. 24) (emphasismine)
As is evident here, in as early as 2003 the Committee
moves beyond an implied right to legal agency, to stip-
ulating the provision of mechanisms for its realisation.
4.1. Article 12
Thus, states are required to provide children access to
judicial and quasi-judicial complaints procedures, with-
out qualification as to age. This is further supported by
Article 12 of the CRC on the child’s right to be heard,
one of the four “general principles” of the CRC, which
“highlights the role of the child as an active partici-
pant in the promotion, protection and monitoring of his
or her rights” (General Comment No. 5 (2003) General
measures of implementation of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (arts. 4, 42 and 44, para. 6), 2003,
para. 12) (emphasis mine). This stems from the Conven-
tion’s recognition of “the child as a subject of rights, and
the nearly universal ratification of this international in-
strument by States parties emphasizes this status of the
child, which is clearly expressed in article 12” (General
Comment No. 12 (2009) The right of the child to be heard,
2009, para. 18). Children are to be actively engaged in
the process of protection and monitoring of their rights,
strengthened by the proviso that “Involvement of and
consultation with children must also avoid being tokenis-
tic” (General Comment No. 5 (2003) General measures of
implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (arts. 4, 42 and 44, para. 6), 2003, para. 12), distin-
guishing between “listening” as an end in itself, and as
a means:
But appearing to “listen” to children is relatively un-
challenging; giving due weight to their views requires
real change. Listening to children should not be seen
as an end in itself, but rather as a means by which
States make their interactions with children and their
actions on behalf of children ever more sensitive
to the implementation of children’s rights. (General
Comment No. 5 (2003) General measures of imple-
mentation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(arts. 4, 42 and 44, para. 6), 2003, para. 12)
Hence, it is not merely that the child should “express”
her views (Art. 12(1)), but Article 12 stipulates that she is
to be listened to, and heard (Art. 12 (2)). Accordingly, the
concept of “voice” used in this article is that of legal voice.
It posits that for children’s voices to bemeaningful in the
context of the Article 12 “right to be heard”, children do
not merely have the right to “express their views”, with
respect to the Article 12 qualification of “matters that af-
fect them”. Rather, children have the right to have their
voices “heard” by an adjudication body: “either directly,
or through a representative” as per Art. 12 (2). This con-
cept of voice is to be distinguished from political “partici-
pation” in that it hinges on the active participation of the
child in the legal process through the provision of legal
agency to children (see Section 4.3 below).
4.2. Lifting the Lid on Article 12: General Comment
No. 12 (2009) on the Right of the Child to Be Heard
The legal interpretation of Article 12 rendered by the CRC
Committee in General Comment No. 12 (2009) further
supports this claim of the centrality of legal agency to Ar-
ticle 12. It highlights seven elements of the right to be
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heard, which can be seen to be central to the provision
of legal agency to children, as follows: namely, (i) Arti-
cle 12 as a rule of procedure; (ii) the necessity of the
provision of children’s access to complaints procedures;
(iii) the presumption of capacity; (iv) the non-imposition
of an age-limit; (v) the inadequacy of simply “listening”
to children; (vi) how the child must be heard; and (vii),
the child’s right to be heard “directly”. First, as one of
the four general principles of the CRC, the Committee
reinforces the procedural quality of Article 12: “this ar-
ticle establishes not only a right in itself, but should also
be considered in the interpretation and implementation
of all other rights” (General Comment No. 12 (2009) The
right of the child to be heard, 2009, para. 2). It thereby
“provides the methodology for hearing the views of the
child or children and their inclusion in all matters affect-
ing the child” (General Comment No. 14 (2013) on the
right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as
a primary consideration (art. 3, para. 1), 2013, para. 43)
(emphasis mine).
Secondly, one of the five steps enumerated for the
implementation of Article 12 is the provision by states
of legislation to “provide children with complaint proce-
dures and remedies”, and that “children should have the
possibility of addressing an ombudsman or a person of a
comparable role in all children’s institutions…in order to
voice their complaints” (General Comment No. 12 (2009)
The right of the child to be heard, 2009, para. 46). Thus,
the “child must have access to appeals and complaints
procedures which provide remedies for rights violations”
(General Comment No. 12 (2009) The right of the child to
be heard, 2009, para. 47).
This is in turn inextricably linked to one of the core
obligations imposed upon states by Article 12, namely
“to review or amend their legislation in order to intro-
duce mechanisms providing children with…procedures
for complaints, remedies or redress” (para. 48). Conse-
quently, the wording: “in a manner consistent with the
procedural rules of national law” in subsection 2 of Ar-
ticle 12 cannot be used as an obstacle to accommoda-
tion of the legal agency of children as it “should not be
interpreted as permitting the use of procedural legisla-
tion which restricts or prevents enjoyment of this funda-
mental right” (para. 38).Where such legislation exists, of-
ten supported by deeply-held views about childhood vul-
nerability, states are advised that in order to fulfil these
obligations they should adopt a number of strategies,
not least of which is to “combat negative attitudes…to
change widespread customary conceptions of the child”
(General Comment No. 12 (2009) The right of the child to
be heard, 2009, para. 49).
The presumption of capacity is the third element of
the Committee’s legal analysis of Article 12 that is indis-
pensable to legal agency. The wording in Subsection 1 of
Article 12, “capable of forming his or her own views”, is
not to be read as a limitation to capacity, which means
that one “cannot begin with the assumption that a child
is incapable of expressing her or his own views. On the
contrary, States parties should presume that a child has
the capacity to form her or his own views and recognize
that she or he has the right to express them; it is not up
to the child to first prove her or his capacity” (para. 20).
Additionally, General Comment No. 12 makes it clear
that the right is to extend to all children, regardless of
their age and that Article 12 imposes no age limit on the
right of the child to express her views. States parties are
“discourage[d] from introducing age limits either in law
or in practice which would restrict the child’s right to be
heard in all matters affecting her” (para. 21). Pre-verbal
infants also come under its banner of protection, and
“consequently, full implementation of article 12 requires
recognition of, and respect for, non-verbal forms of com-
munication including play, body language, facial expres-
sions, and drawing and painting, through which very
young children demonstrate understanding, choices, and
preferences” (para. 21).
Another relevant element for our purposes is the am-
bit of the clause “being given due weight in accordance
with age and maturity of the child”, which is to be read
in light of the presumption of capacity. Accordingly, it
“stipulates that simply listening to the child is insufficient;
the views of the child have to be seriously considered”
(para. 28). That is to say, the child must be heard, their
views being assessed on a case-by-case basis. As to how
their view must be heard, this is provided for in subsec-
tion 2 of Article 12, which specifies the right “to be heard
in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting
the child”. This applies to any and “all relevant judicial
proceedings…without limitation”, and indispensably, for
our purposes, “applies to proceedingswhich are initiated
by the child…as well as to those initiated by others which
affect the child” (para. 33). This right is to be facilitated by
an appropriate environment, both accessible and child-
appropriate (para. 34). Adult-oriented judicial and admin-
istrative systems will not suffice.
Finally, subsection 2 of Article 12 provides for the
child being heard directly, pursuant to the wording “Ei-
ther directly, or through a representative or an appropri-
ate body”. In General Comment No. 12, the Committee
“recommends that, wherever possible, the child must be
given the opportunity to bedirectly heard in any proceed-
ings” (para. 35).
4.3. Voice: Participation versus Legal Agency
The right to be heard, pursuant to this interpretation of
Article 12, is to be distinguished from its common as-
sociation with political “participation”. As the Commit-
tee makes clear in General Comment No. 12, the draft-
ing history of the CRC supports this distinction; indeed,
the proviso “in all matters affecting the child” (Art. 12(1)
was added to ensure “that no general political mandate
was intended” (para. 27). However, the right to be heard
is used often in the sense of consultation with children,
where “the views expressed by children may add rel-
evant perspectives and experience and should be con-
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sidered in decision-making, policymaking and prepara-
tion of laws and/or measures as well as their evaluation”
(para. 12)—procedures that “are usually called participa-
tion” (para. 13). This viewof Article 12 is referred to in the
so-called “Three Ps” of the CRC, “provision, protection
and participation”, and is reflected in current practice:
A widespread practice has emerged in recent years,
which has been broadly conceptualized as “participa-
tion”, although this term itself does not appear in the
text of article 12. This term has evolved and is now
widely used to describe ongoing processes, which in-
clude information-sharing and dialogue between chil-
dren and adults based on mutual respect, and in
which children can learn how their views and those of
adults are taken into account and shape the outcome
of such processes. (General Comment No. 12 (2009)
The right of the child to be heard, 2009, para. 3)
This view is not, however, without its critics: Nigel
Cantwell (then-Coordinator of the NGO Group for the
CRC, having taken part in the drafting) makes the case
that participation presents us with cause for alarm as
an example of rights inflation that is putting the human
rights consensus at risk (Cantwell, 2011, p. 42). Cantwell
details the drafting history of General Comment No. 12—
from being the theme chosen for the 2006 Day of Gen-
eral Discussion for the CRC Committee, to its tumultuous
deliberations and approval three years later. He then ex-
presses disapprobation at elements of the Report which
followed, which suggested an inflationary rights agenda,
namely the full-participation of children in “all aspects
of society” through a “leap” of an interpretation of Arti-
cle 12, that “The new and deeper meaning of this right
[to participate] is that it should establish a new social con-
tract” (Day of Discussion on the right of the child to be
heard, 2006, p. 2):
This is arguably quite a leap. One wonders what other
CRC rightsmay suddenly be deemed to have “newand
deeper” meanings, what those meanings might al-
legedly imply, andwhether States Parties to the treaty
are prepared to accept that they knowingly signed up
to them. Clearly, if this kind of rights inflation is ac-
cepted, it will be almost impossible to avoid substan-
tially sapping the strength of the original right in ques-
tion and to engage states through credible advocacy.
(Cantwell, 2011, p. 56)
In the end, “there seemed to be a recognition that mat-
ters were getting out of hand” and fortunately (as far
as Cantwell’s critique goes) the text that resulted in the
form of General Comment No. 12 demonstrates that the
“Committee successfully resisted an “inflationary” mind-
set and settled on a text that is, overall, realistic and well-
founded” (Cantwell, 2011, p. 56).
Cantwell’s critique of interpretations of Article 12 is
levelled at the political elements of this form of par-
ticipation, as against constructions of the right that
“can be considered as the symbol for [children’s] recog-
nition as rights holders”, which “implies, on the long
term, changes in political, social, institutional and cul-
tural structures” (Day of Discussion on the right of the
child to be heard, 2006, p. 2). Consequently, Article 12 is
not to be construed as freedomof expression. If anything,
Article 12 presents us instead with a right that grants le-
gal agency in cases that directly impact upon a child, and
particularly when administrative and judicial decisions
are beingmade about their lives. Cantwell elucidates this
through his reading of the drafting history of the CRC and
the following points are manifested, among others: that
Article 12 “is not a restatement of the general right to
“freedom of expression” but is directly linked to the con-
text and requirement of consultation with the child”. Sec-
ondly, “the ‘matters’ it seeks to refer to are clearly meant
to be those that are directly pertinent to the life of the
child concerned, not general issues that may have ramifi-
cations for children” (Cantwell, 2011, p. 55). For themost
part, this is in line with the interpretation that the CRC
Committee formally offers in General Comment No. 12
(see Section 4.2).
Article 12 is dubbed a number of labels, which both
label and in so doing, interpret the provision. An analysis
of the language used to describe Article 12 across all the
General Comments of the CRC Committee thus affords
an alternativemeans throughwhich to ascertain the legal
content of Article 12. EachGeneral Comment,with the ex-
ception of a few, devotes a section to Article 12 as one of
the general principles of the Convention, in light of which
every substantive right must be interpreted. I study the
language used in the titles, the pseudonyms if you will,
of how Article 12 is labelled in all the CRC General Com-
ments to date. My survey of the title language is supple-
mented with a detailed reading of the sections’ contents.
This preliminary analysis of language reveals theminority
of the “participation” element of interpretation: only two
percent of General Comments use the word “participate”
in their descriptions of Article 12. Not surprisingly per-
haps, the most recent “General Comment No. 20 (2016)
on the Implementation of the Rights of the Child during
Adolescence” is the only General Comment to have used
this language to describe Article 12. The survey is limited
to the language used in the titles of the sections devoted
to Article 12, as one of the four general principles of the
CRC, the results of which are shown in Figure 1.
This preliminary survey of the title language is use-
ful as a way of approaching the interpretation of Article
12 in the context of General Comments which can be var-
ied, broad and, at times, disjointed. Notably, the predom-
inance of the language of “right to” and “be heard” fur-
ther supports the claim that Article 12 grants the right to
be heard in judicial and quasi-judicial settings, and is to
be distinguished from political participation in the form
of the freedom to “express views”.
Nonetheless, as one would expect, the language
used in the General Comments becomes more varied,
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“Have them taken into account”
“Being given due weight”
“Parcipate”
Figure 1. Language analysis of references to Art. 12 in CRC General Comments (1–20).
and at times difficult to generalise upon examination of
the contents of these sections. A more detailed survey
of the General Comments of the CRC Committee reveals
more of a focus on participation. For example, “General
comment No. 19 (2016) on Public Budgeting for the Re-
alization of Children’s Rights (art. 4)” equates, and limits,
the right to be heard as the right to participate: “States
parties should regularly hear children’s views on bud-
get decisions that affect them, through mechanisms for
the meaningful participation of children at the national
and subnational levels. Participants in thosemechanisms
should be able to contribute freely and without fear of
repression or ridicule and States parties should provide
feedback to those who participated. In particular, States
parties should consult with children who face difficulties
in making themselves heard, including children in vulner-
able situations” (para. 52), and should ensure the pro-
vision of user-friendly information (para. 54), and free-
dom of information (para. 55). Regrettably, no reference
is made throughout to children’s access to remedial pro-
cedures. General Comment No. 15 (2013) on the Right
to Health, too, lists only the participation elements: “Ar-
ticle 12 highlights the importance of children’s participa-
tion, providing for children to express their views and to
have such views seriously taken into account, according
to age and maturity”. Promisingly, in “General Comment
No. 14 (2013) on Best Interests of the Child (art. 3)”, ref-
erence is made to subsection 2, which is detailed under
the section “Procedural safeguards to guarantee the im-
plementation of the child’s best interests”. However, the
right of the child is, again, delimited to the “right of the
child to express his or her views” which is in turn linked
to representation: “the child wishes to express his or her
views and where this right is fulfilled through a represen-
tative”. No mention is made of the child’s direct right to
legal capacity and agency as crucial to the right to be
heard (General Comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of
the child to have his or her best interests taken as a pri-
mary consideration (art. 3, para. 1), 2013, para. 90).
General comment No. 16 (2013) on State Obligations
Regarding the Impact of the Business Sector on Chil-
dren’s Rights is the most promising: it separates the par-
ticipation element from the legal agency—political from
legal voice. The Introduction and Objectives make this di-
vision clear:
Children are often politically voiceless and lack access
to relevant information. They are reliant on gover-
nance systems, over which they have little influence,
to have their rights realized. This makes it hard for
them to have a say in decisions regarding laws and
policies that impact their rights. In the process of
decision-making, States may not adequately consider
the impact on children of business-related laws and
policies, while, conversely, the business sector often
exerts a powerful influence on decisions without ref-
erence to children’s rights. (para. 4(b))
This is immediately followed with a direct link to lack of
children’s legal agency:
It is generally challenging for children to obtain
remedy—whether in the courts or through other
mechanisms—when their rights are infringed upon,
even more so by business enterprises. Children of-
ten lack legal standing, knowledge of remedy mech-
anisms, financial resources and adequate legal repre-
sentation. (para. 4(c))
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Thus, one of the stated aims of the said General Com-
ment No. 16 (2013) is to provide states with guidance
specifically on how to “Ensure access to effective rem-
edy for children whose rights have been infringed by
a business enterprise acting as a private party or as a
State agent.”
States should ensure that adolescents are involved
in the development, implementation and monitoring
of all relevant legislation, policies, services and pro-
grammes affecting their lives, at school and at the
community, local, national and international levels.
The online environment provides significant emerg-
ing opportunities for strengthening and expanding
their engagement (General commentNo. 16 (2013) on
State obligations regarding the impact of the business
sector on children’s rights, 2013, para. 23)
In contrast, General Comment 20 (2016) on adolescent
rights, connects the right to a remedy with legal agency:
“The measures should be accompanied by the introduc-
tion of safe and accessible complaint and redress mech-
anisms with the authority to adjudicate claims made by
adolescents, and by access to subsidized or free legal ser-
vices and other appropriate assistance” (General com-
ment No. 20 (2016) on the implementation of the rights
of the child during adolescence, 2016, para. 23) (my em-
phasis). Accordingly, adolescents are to have the right
to make claims directly to judicial bodies specifically em-
powered to adjudicate such cases.
Finally, though joint General Comment No. 18 (2014)
on Harmful Practices (with the Convention on the Elim-
ination of Discrimination against Women) does not de-
vote a section to Article 12, direct reference is made to
legal agency as a component of the right to be heard:
Victims seeking justice for violations of their rights
as a result of harmful practices often face stigmatiza-
tion, a risk of revictimization, harassment and possi-
ble retribution. Steps must therefore be taken to en-
sure that the rights of girls and women are protected
throughout the legal process, in accordance with ar-
ticles 2 (c) and 15 (2) and (3) of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, and that children are enabled to effectively
engage in court proceedings as part of their right to be
heard under article 12 of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (Joint General Recommendation No. 31 /
General Comment No. 18 on harmful practices, 2014,
para. 85) (emphasis mine).
As the foregoing analysis has tried to demonstrate, legal
agency—defined as the right of children to submit com-
plaints directly to judicial and administrative bodies—is
an indispensable part of the Article 12 right to be heard.
Though there has been much scholarship on the provi-
sion as a participation right, the tectonic shifts it heralds,
in terms of granting legal agency to children, has received
little or scant attention. Laura Lundy has expressed criti-
cism of the “abbreviations for Article 12” such as “pupil
voice” as having the “potential to diminish its impact as
they provide an imperfect summary of the full extent of
the obligation” (Lundy, 2007, p. 927) thereby conclud-
ing that voice alone is not enough. She successfully advo-
cates the importance of Article 12 in the educational con-
text, but her analysis too runs the risk of weighing in too
heavily on “voice” and subsection 1, at the expense of
agency and subsection 2. This section has attempted to
remedy that deficit. Through the analysis of the “abbre-
viations” used by the CRC Committee in its General Com-
ments for Article 12, supplemented with a deeper read-
ing of the articulations of the content of that right, I hope
to have made at least as strong a case for legal agency as
there is for participation in legal interpretations of Arti-
cle 12. I take up the challenge keenly expressedby Kay Tis-
dall in her evaluation of Article 12 as participation rights,
that “we need to question why there are not more rad-
ical notions of children and young people’s involvement
in their social, economic, cultural and political contexts
than to have due regard to their views” (Tisdall, 2015,
p. 197). The legal agency of children is radical, as it dera-
cinates the legal disabilities that lay at the legal founda-
tions ofWestern liberal legal ideology. Having thus estab-
lished the centrality of legal agency to Article 12, I now
proceed with using this as the lens through which to ex-
amine the right of the child to be heard in bullying cases
in Norway.
5. Tracing Children’s Bullying Complaints
5.1. Bullying at Law
The analysis that follows is not concerned with providing
an extensive overview of the bullying laws in Norway as
much as it concerns the right of the child to be heard,
using bullying in Norway as a springboard for discussion.
Historically, bullying laws in Norway have been ignited by
tragediesmarked by the absence of hearing the voices of
bullied children,which have bruised the public conscious-
ness and have prompted a spate of political and legal ini-
tiatives. The year 1994 witnessed a national tragedy of
the horrific murder of five-year-old Silje Redergard at the
hands of two six-year-old boys with whom she was play-
ing on a football field in Trondheim. Dubbed the Norwe-
gian Bulger case, it sets the scene for the series of govern-
ment actions taken to counter bullying in the decade that
would follow. The new initiatives against bullying that it
spurred began in 2002 and were driven directly by the
voices of children themselves:
I think really the focus on bullying started with the
pupils themselves because they made the Ombuds-
man for Children aware of the problem that was
in Norwegian schools and we really felt that it was
time to do something about it because it seemed
like the adult community were ignoring the very sad
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fact that a lot of children really were scared to go
to school. (Deputy Ombudsman for Children, cited in
Wakefield, 2007)
The result was the Government-led “Manifesto against
Bullying”, which galvanised action against bullying and
led to the introduction of the new law in Section 9a of the
Education Act affording children the same rights in their
workplace as adults have in theirs; namely, it afforded
pupils the legal right to a safe, bully-free working envi-
ronment. Thus, the first bullying legislationwas expressly
driven by the child’s right to be heard—indeed it was chil-
dren’s voices themselves thatwas the catalyst for change.
Once again in 2014, the despair of not being heard that
led to Odin’s suicide was thick in the public air, and mo-
bilised the public once again into rallying against bullying.
It resulted in the establishment of a government commis-
sion to consider the overallmeasures necessary to create
a good psychosocial environment, and to prevent and
address bullying and other incidents in schools. The re-
sulting “Djupedal Report”, entitled “ToBelong:Means for
a Safe Psychosocial School Environment” and published
in 2015, engaged closely with Section 9a and will be re-
ferred to at length in the analysis below, as it provides
a useful literature survey of the field, in addition to pro-
viding inroads for discussing the legal implications of Sec-
tion 9a, specifically children’s complaint rights in context
and in practice. The Commission, like the literature on
bullying itself, comprised of a mix of experts from policy
and educational backgrounds, but with a lawyer admit-
ted to the Supreme Court, Tor Kielland, who specialises
in employment law and bullying. Much of the literature
on bullying is in the social sciences, education and psy-
chology, with little legal literature available, with the ex-
ception of the report commissioned from the Faculty of
Law, University of Oslo (Welstad & Warp, 2010) by the
Ministry of Education. Notably, for our purposes, the au-
thors make the keen observation that “pupils’ voices are
in the background” in Section 9a cases; that although the
children are the holders of legal rights, they:
Do not have the same perspectives and assumptions
as adults to assert their rights. In matters pertaining
to students’ psychosocial environment there are strin-
gent requirements for the role of responsible adults as
competent communicators of children’s rights. Adult
persons and school employees have by virtue of their
age and their position an ethical claim on the pupils.
They can largely choose whether to apply this in favor
of the pupils or to their own or possibly school inter-
ests. For example, it may be the case that children and
young people choose to express what the others think
are perceived as a desirable response to a greater ex-
tent than their own, sincere experiences of a situation.
(Welstad & Warp, 2010, p. 94)
Effectively, without using the terms, Welstad and Warp
speak of a “voice-over” effect by adults on a child’s
voice due to the significant power imbalances in this con-
text. They thus recommend the sharpening of require-
ments of the legislation by making the child’s right to
be heard an independent part of Section 9a that “will
have a symbolic value that sends the signals of the impor-
tance of emphasising the students’ own voice in matters
affecting their school environment” (Andenæs & Møller,
2016, p. 79). More recently, in Rights in School, Andenæs
and Møller provide a broad interdisciplinary account be-
tween pedagogical, legal and political perspectives, and
briefly discuss the Section 9a right to a good psychosocial
environment at school (Andenæs & Møller, 2016).
Turning now to the nucleus of the law, importantly,
Section 9a provides children with “an individual right to
a good school environment that promotes health, well-
being and learning. The school will actively and system-
atically work to promote a good psychosocial environ-
ment where the individual student can experience se-
curity and social belonging” (Andenæs & Møller, 2016,
p. 182). Thus, its two important elements, being the
individual child’s subjective right, in addition to the re-
sponsibility of the school, are of the essence. Section
9a-1 reads: “All pupils attending primary and secondary
schools are entitled to a good physical and psychosocial
environment conducive to health, well-being and learn-
ing.”Written into Section 9a-3 is the individual child as di-
rect beneficiary of the law, entitled to a “good psychoso-
cial environment, where individual pupils can experience
security and social belonging”. It is the student’s subjec-
tive experience that needs to be met:
It’s not that there is an adult at the schoolwhodecides
whether a student has a good psychosocial school en-
vironment or not. In Proposition No. 72(2001–2002),
the Ministry has stressed that it is the student who—
based on their subjective experience—determines if
the court is satisfied or not. If this principle had been
altered, the pupil’s position would be significantly
weakened. It would also be problematic if an adult
person could tell a child that she must endure. This
could be a new infringement….Part of the child’s dig-
nity consists of recognising and respecting children
and adolescents as rights holders, and Article 12 on
the child’s right to be heard. (Djupedal & Norge, 2015,
pp. 210–211)
Thus, it is to be the “voice” of the individual child that
is to be the standard. Not the “voice-over” by adults in
the school.
Secondly, it is the school’s responsibility to “make ac-
tive and systematic efforts to promote” the stated aim of
Section 9a: “the school management is responsible for
the day-to-day implementation” and individual school
employees have a duty to investigate, notify and if pos-
sible intervene upon learning or suspicion of “offensive
language or acts such as bullying, discrimination, vio-
lence or racism.” Thus, Section 9a-3 comprises what is
termed an action duty on the part of the school. Lastly,
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and importantly for our purposes, 9a-3 enshrines the
school’s obligation tomake decisions:
Paragraph 9a-3 third paragraph contains an obligation
for the school through the principal tomake decisions
under the Public Administration Act if the student or
parent asks for measures related to the psychosocial
school environment. Measures can also be requested
by students and student groups. The threshold for
considering something like a request from the stu-
dent or parents that triggers the obligation to make
decisions is low. It is the student or parents who de-
cide whether they want a decision or not when the
pupil’s right are not met. Individual decisions must
consider whether a school pupil was justly dealt with,
and which measures may be incorporated for the stu-
dent’s right to be fulfilled. The measures shall be law-
ful, appropriate and sufficient for the student’s rights
to be met. A plain decision shall be made in accor-
dance with the procedural rules for decisions in the
Public Administration Act and the CRC. That means,
the school will evaluate whether the measures would
be best for the child, and the child should be heard, ac-
cording to Articles 3 and 12 of the CRC. However, it is
not the students’ and parents’ subjective experience
that are the basis when deciding what action is initi-
ated. This depends on what has happened, and is a
professional assessment of what measures would be
appropriate and sufficient. The plain decision may be
appealed to the County. (Djupedal & Norge, 2015, pp.
231–232) (Translated by the author)
Thus, it is the child’s subjective “voice” which is to be
the standard; the adults have a statutory obligation to
“hear” and to act in the form of a reasoned individual
decision. The current law and its so-called two-track ap-
proach, comprising of an action duty in addition to the
separate duty to make decisions, are critically assessed
in the Djupedal Report with a resulting recommendation
for law reform that unites these currently existing two-
tracks into a single procedure. Notably, the recommen-
dations of the Djupedal Report were catalytic as the crit-
ical background to the new revised Education Act, since
drafted by the Ministry of Education and approved by
Parliament and entered into force 1 August 2017. Thus,
though the Report is not so much a legally authoritative
source per se, it now has strengthened legal status as
travaux préparatoires for the revised Section 9a. I now
turn to the Report and its recommendations.
5.2. The Djupedal Report (2015)
The Djupedal Report published in 2015 identifies fivema-
jor challenges. The first of which, the rule of law, will be
the focal point of this discussion, as it aims at strengthen-
ing student’s legal rights through a more effective com-
plaints procedure under Section 9a. Though this is not
directly tied to the Article 12 right to be heard by the
Commission, themeasures proposed in the Report,more
generally, are stated to be “From Human Rights to Prac-
tice”, where the “Commission looks at what is needed
for students’ rights under the CRC and Education Act to
be fulfilled in practice” (Djupedal & Norge, 2015, p. 142).
Thus, the Report has at the heart of its reformagenda the
implementation of the rights of the Convention. In words
that present a bleaker picture than the UNICEF Study of
Implementation, the Commission states that
There is a need to clarify the central principles of
the Convention in the Education Act. Reviews of the
schools and county government decisions in 9a af-
fairs show that CRC Article 3 to a small extent is being
drawn upon, and that it is almost not visible that the
student is heard, pursuant to Article 12, CRC…there is
a need to strengthen Article 12 and the right of chil-
dren to be heard in the Education Act. (p. 205)
The Report then cites the CRC’s Committee’s Concluding
Observations on Norway in 2010, expressing concern at
the implementation of Article 12:
The Committee is however concerned that children’s
right to be heard is not fully implemented in practice
or effectively practiced in all phases of the processes
of making decisions or arrive at arrangements for chil-
dren’s lives….The Committee recommends that the
State party continue and strengthen efforts to imple-
ment fully article 12 of the Convention, and promote
due respect for the views of children of all ages in ad-
ministrative and judicial processes….The Committee
recommends that the State party take into account
the Committee’s General Comment No. 12 from 2009,
the child’s right to be heard. (p. 205)
Overall, the Report makes a hundred or so recommenda-
tions to Parliament for the strengthening of children’s le-
gal protection at school. Speaking to the rule of law chal-
lenge, the specific recommendationsmade in Chapters 15
and 16 include the following: that the general principles
of the Convention (including Article 12 right to be heard)
are established by law in the EducationAct, Sections 1 and
9a (p. 23); a new action duty is proposed with statutory
requirements as to how schools should treat violations
of students (p. 23); and finally, the recommendation that
the existing complaints procedure be changed (p. 24).
The Report cites student dissatisfaction with school,
among other sources, to demonstrate the ineffective-
ness—indeed illegality—of schools’ practice under Sec-
tion 9a: “’Only’ two percent say they are satisfied with
[their environment] at school. As for the students who
feel that they are being bullied or harassed, the implica-
tion is that the requirements of the Education Act are not
beingmet, and that school owners and schools are acting
unlawfully. It is not acceptable”(p. 145). Further, adults
in the schools have little knowledge of their obligations
under the Act.
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The Individual complaints procedure under Section
9a, as it stands, is assessed and found to be wanting. De-
spite providing students with “strong legal rights” and
legal protection (p. 198), the lack of knowledge on the
part of schools and the concomitant lack of enforcement
are identified as principal causes of the ineffectiveness
of Section 9a:
Students have, in the Education Act strong rights that
trigger duties for the school owner, the school and
all of its employees. However, it is a challenge that
regulatory compliance is not good enough, and that
the rights and obligations in the Education Act Section
9a are not fulfilled. The Commission believes the re-
sponsibilities that school owners and all the staff at
the school have must be clear for students to have a
safe psychosocial school environment that promotes
health, well-being and learning. The Commission be-
lieves there is a need to examine the contents of the
student’s right and the requirements for school own-
ers and schools to ensure that students’ rights are ful-
filled. The Education Act is currently a law without le-
gal tools to impose the implementation of measures
in decisions or the like. It is necessary to provide bet-
ter legal protection for students through a clearer sys-
temwith effective complaints and inspection services.
(pp. 146–147)
Thus, a child or her parents have the right to request
the school to take action pursuant to Section 9a-3, and
the school must make a decision by the Public Adminis-
tration Act, where the school is to reach a decision on
whether the students’ rights are fullymet, andwhich con-
tains measures that should be fulfilled. However, as the
Report indicates, there are no figures at the national or
county levels that show how many decisions under Sec-
tion 9a-3 are undertaken by schools every year:
Bergens Tidende conducted in 2013 a study in which
they examined whether schools in the Bergen area
made decisions under § 9a-3 third paragraph or not.
They found significant differences. They found that 29
of primary schools had not made any decisions in the
past three years, while a school had 29 decisions in
the past year. There is no reason to believe that one
school had somanymore offenses than the other. The
school with 29 decisions was, according to Bergens
Tidende one of the schools with the lowest bullying
figures in Bergen. When the school does not make de-
cisions, it will be harder to complain, despite the fact
that it is also possible to complain that the school has
not made a decision within a reasonable time. Miss-
ing decisions are a challenge for legal certainty and
effective legal protection. (p. 199)
Failing an effective decision, the students then have the
right to appeal to the County Governors, a process which
is found by parents to be costly and “little known and lit-
tle used compared with the percentage of pupils in the
student survey in 2014 who reported that they were vi-
olated or bullied two or three times a month or more.
The same applies to previous years also. This can be in-
terpreted as a legal challenge” (p. 249). The figures from
the annual reports submitted by the County Governors
to the Directorate of Education illustrate the number of
complaints under Section 9a-3, which have since 2011
been about 100 per year nationally: “There are variations
between county departments in terms of the number
of complaints they have handled. One office has zero is-
sues, while the average is approximately five to ten cases
a year. Common for offices is that the cases are mainly
related to Grunnskole [elementary and lower secondary
school, ages 6–16] students. There are practically no
complaints related to Videregående [upper secondary,
ages 16–19] education in the past four years combined”
(p. 249).
Thus, the Report suggests a new complaints pro-
cedure, which should be seen in connection with the
changes taking place internationally related to children’s
human rights, specifically OP3 CRC where children have
the right to appeal directly to the UN CRC Committee for
state violations of their human rights when the national
appeal possibilities are exhausted (p. 251). The Commis-
sion finds that the current scheme is not effective:
The Commission believes that in order for students’
legal rights to be real, it is necessary to provide an ef-
fective safeguard against infringement, which means
that there are legal tools that are powerful and can
protect students when the school owner and the
school did not meet their responsibilities. This means
that there must be an independent body to complain
to, and that this body must have legal instruments to
ensure that its decisions are being met. This does not
exist in the current Education Act. A body that deals
with complaints that cannot enforce measures to pro-
tect the pupil, does not provide effective protection
of students’ rights. (p. 251)
The Report concludes that Norway would fall short of
the effectiveness requirement for the domestic remedies
that need to be exhausted in order for a complaint to
be admissible under Article 7, OP3 CRC, where effective-
ness is to be measured by the time and accessibility to
children: the system must not be too lengthy or cumber-
some, and must be known to children:
complaints regarding bullying in schools is one of the
areas that children and young people are most con-
cerned about. This suggests that the complaints pro-
cedure that exists, must be accessible to children and
young people, and that it must be organized in such
a way that they can understand it. The Commission
believes that the considerations cited here, are impor-
tant in determining how the complaints procedure for
violations of school should be organized. (p. 251)
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The consequence of the finding of ineffectiveness would
be that the Committee can then sidestep the require-
ment for exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Report
thus recommends an overhaul of the Section 9a com-
plaints procedure, with a view to improving the legal
rights of students with the introduction of a new activ-
ity obligation, and a national system and where the Om-
budsman for Children is recommended as the first in-
stance authority empowered to make binding decisions
in bullying cases, thereby giving the complaints proce-
dure “teeth”:
This is related to the introduction of activity obligation
and the UN Children’s Committee has stated that na-
tional complaint schemes must be an effective rem-
edy that is child sensitive, ensures a child’s need for
a quick resolution of the matter and is available….By
introducing a duty which clearly regulates how vio-
lations should be handled for that student’s right to
be fulfilled, the student and parents could complain
if they feel this obligation is not fulfilled, and that
the measures adopted are not appropriate and suf-
ficient. Through a new duty of activity, at the first
instance, here we will say the Ombudsman, all re-
quirements regarding the proceedings will need to
be satisfied, whether the measures are appropriate
and sufficient to enable students to again have a safe
psychosocial school environment, and whether the
school / school owner’s supervision has been inade-
quate compared with what expected by Chapter 9a.
This corresponds to the Supreme Court’s considera-
tion in the Kristiansand judgment. The Ombudsman’s
decision can be appealed to the School Environment
Complaints Board. (p. 194)
By establishing a national body to deal with com-
plaints, it will be possible to build up a specialized
expertise in this organ. The Committee sees that
building up a specialized expertise can be impor-
tant because these matters are complex and com-
plicated. Feedback also suggests that county depart-
ments spend a lot of time to process each individual
case. It would probably be more effective with an en-
tity that has specialized expertise (p. 252)
Article 12 is thus viewed in the context of legal agency,
with the need for an effective complaints procedure, in
line with international legal developments in OP3 CRC.
However, political participation is also addressed; that
students are not afforded the right to participate is dis-
cussed in the Report as the third challenge, namely that
students and parents are not involved sufficiently in the
school’s work with the psychosocial school environment
and the prevention and handling of violations and bul-
lying. “For students, the Committee would highlight the
student’s right to be heard inmatters affecting them. The
CRC is not sufficiently anchored in some schools. This
may concern, for example, pupils not being allowed to
express their opinion on how challenges in student cul-
ture are to be resolved, and that students and parents
are informed and involved in following up the results of
the student survey”. (p. 147)
The Djupedal Report thus suggests reforms to the
complaints procedure for children: clarifying internal pro-
cedures and allowing children and parents to complain
to the Ombudsman, with a low threshold. It also advises
the express inclusion of Article 12, as a guiding principle
of the CRC into the text of 9a. However, the Report does
not directly link these two. As we have seen, a central
component of the Article 12 right is to provide the judi-
cial and administrative forums for children to be able to
submit complaints, and to have them heard in an effec-
tive and child-sensitive manner. What the Report char-
acterises as due process rights can be seen as an ele-
ment of the Article 12 right to be heard, as argued in
section 2 above. That is to say, children have the right to
legal agency in order to be able to initiate a claim against
their school—as children—with a low threshold for com-
plaints, and with hope for a speedy resolution of their
case. Further, given also its constitutionally superior hi-
erarchical status as lex superior, the Article 12 right to
be heard as a means of grounding children’s complaint
rights, cannot be underestimated. Thus, we have in Arti-
cle 12, an additional (and perhaps stronger) basis upon
which legal agency for children subjected to violations of
their human rights can be grounded. Critically, as noted
above, the Reportwas the catalyst for law reformand the
revised Section 9a: Prop.57 L approved by Parliament 9
June 2017 (Law 38), which will have the elevated legal
status of as travaux préparatoires.
5.3. Voicing Concerns: Child Complaints to the
Ombudsman for Children
To return to Fortin’s image of the ladder of child involve-
ment in judicial processes, children who have not been
drawn into the machinery of legal procedures (through
juvenile justice or family law proceedings, most com-
monly) struggle yet to find a ladder. Section 9a repre-
sents such a ladder within the educational context, and
listening to the voices of children at the first stage of
complaint affords a means of ascertaining which rung
of the ladder most accurately represents the voices of
bullied children. Currently, the Ombudsman does not
have any powers to consider individual complaints from
children: “The Ombudsman does not have the author-
ity to decide cases or set aside decisions in the admin-
istration” (Section 1, The Ombudsman for Children, Nor-
way Act and Instructions). Though the Djupedal Report
recommended that the appeals to the County Gover-
nors be replaced with a specialised complaint procedure
at the Office of the Ombudsman for Children, this was
not taken up in the revised version of the law. How-
ever, children and young people up to eighteen years
of age have been able to submit (anonymous) questions
to the Ombudsman, online. The cases concerning bul-
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lying in schools that are analysed here are taken from
the questions archive on the website of the Ombudsman
for Children (www.barneombudet.no), and the bullying
cases are mainly found under the theme “bullying” and
“school”, and cover the questions from October 2013 to
October 2016.
The findings comprise a case digest of twenty-five
cases. Of the cases, only two relate to a single inci-
dent, whereas twenty-three of the cases concern bul-
lying by teachers and other pupils for at least a year
or longer. The ages of the children submitting the com-
plaints fall mostly within the fifteen to seventeen-year-
old age bracket, with the youngest complainant being
eleven years of age. There was one complaint received
each from an eleven, twelve and thirteen-year-old, re-
spectively. In twenty-one of the cases, the child stated
that the teacher or the school ignored their complaint.
Three children wanted to take legal action against the
school and two children expressed a desire for civil ac-
tion in the form of compensation. In one case, a sixteen-
year-old girl was acting as a pseudo-guardian, voicing
her concerns for her younger brother in seventh grade
who had been bullied for several years. She describes the
physical violence to which her brother was subjected: in
2015, he was beaten and had to be airlifted to a hospital
where they detected concussion and was in urgent need
of nose surgery. The girl wrote that the school did not
care and the father was shut out when he wanted to see
the principal.
The children’s voices are articulate, succinctly ex-
pressing the problems they are facing, as well as their
dissatisfaction with the process at school. The desire to
take the complaint further, reflects voices that are seek-
ing remedies, and this is not limited to the older children.
By way of example, the youngest of the complainants, ex-
pressed concerns that spoke to the gaps between school
policies and practice. The eleven-year-old girl had been
bullied since kindergarten by both students and teach-
ers, and wrote that she felt that the school was just writ-
ing resolutions without much happening in practice. The
Ombudsman for Children advised her that only when the
school makes resolutions that do not work should she
complain to the County Governor, and if that does not
help, to contact the Ombudsman for Children again. This
is quite a standard response to the questions submitted
by the children.
From 2013 to 2016, we have a pool of twenty-five
complaints submitted by children to the Ombudsman,
spanning the ages that are most common among the
complaints submitted to the County Governors (see Sec-
tion 5.2 above). However, contrary to the findings from
those very same reports, that “there were practically
no complaints related to upper secondary education in
the past four years combined” (Djupedal & Norge, 2015,
p. 249) (2011–2014, coinciding with the years examined
here) complaints were submitted to the Ombudsman for
Children by twenty-eight percent of students in that age
bracket. This can indicate that the County Governor ap-
peal process is too high a threshold. This is supported
by the fact that only in one case did the seventeen-year-
old indicate that complaints had been sent to the County
Governor, indeed seven times, but to no avail, and with
no consequence.
The genuine “voices” expressed by the children who
are bullied at school can be seen as tokenistic in the
sense that they are not “heard” as complaints in a formal
quasi-judicial or judicial setting. Often, the responses
they receive are templates, advising children that they
should contact their school, and failing action, that they
should contact their respective County Governors. De-
spite there being, here in the informal complaints to
the Ombudsman for Children, a genuine expression of
voice—absent their role as legal agents and being able to
present their complaints before an adjudicator who can
provide a decision granting relief—the voices of children
are muffled and silenced. As this survey illustrates, this
is reflected in the informal complaints submitted by chil-
dren to the Ombudsman for Children, especially in the
cases where these children’s bullying complaints are not
formally registered by the school system—indeed they
are said not to have complained at all—and are there-
fore invisible. Looking up from the ground, then, the pic-
ture does not seem too promising for children’s voice
in bullying cases in Norway. Given that the “process of
norm-setting, i.e. the creation of children’s rights legal
standards, tends to be top-down and adult-driven” (Van-
denhole, 2015, p. 39), to conclude with the inverse ap-
proach, the only decision on bullying before the Norwe-
gian Supreme Court will now be explored for the light it
may shed on the child’s right to be heard.
5.4. Supreme Court “Kristiansand Decision” 2012
The Norwegian Supreme Court case, called the Kris-
tiansand decision (HR-2012-241-A—Rt-2012-146) is a
historical verdict; the first case before the SupremeCourt
concerning compensation for bullying in schools. In this
ground-breaking case, a bullying victim was granted
over 900,000 kroner in compensation after the Supreme
Court rejected the appeal from the municipality. The im-
portance of the unanimous judgment lies in it being the
first time a municipality was held to be responsible for
bullying at school, and in its wake, there have been suc-
cessful awards of compensation before district and ap-
peal courts.
The case concerns that of an adult in his late twenties
initiating a compensation claim against the Kristiansand
Municipality for suffering post-traumatic stress disorder
as the result of severe bullying experienced at school
from six to eleven years of age. It was dismissed by the
District Court at the first instance; though bullying had
been established, the school staff were acquitted of any
wrongful conduct or negligence. The applicant therefore
appealed, uponwhich, the lower court decisionwas over-
turned by the High Court of Agder, finding against the
Municipality on the grounds of negligence by the em-
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ployees by the doctrine of cumulative error, where “it
is not necessary to prove each individual’s fault or neg-
ligence” (para. 38). This decision is situated squarely in
the original intent behind Section 9a of the Education
Act, whereby students are to be recognised as having em-
ployee rights in their working environment. The Court
used the standard of care required by employers, with
primary schools regarded as a “service”, where the stu-
dents were not afforded the good working environment
to which they were entitled. Of the essence is that this
case was brought by an adult in his late twenties, and
is indicative of the temporal problem that children face
in claiming their rights. This reflects the criticisms raised
in the Ministry’s Mapping of bullying cases before the
County Governors (2010), as well as the Welstad Report
(2011), where the length of time it takes for children’s
cases to be heard was highlighted as a fundamental
problem (Djupedal & Norge, 2015, pp. 249–250). Here,
the applicant was well into adulthood by the time his
voice could be heard, which raises the question: must a
child reach adulthood in order to be able to claim her
rights? Must she necessarily speak with an adult’s voice?
I argue that this challenges the central element of Ar-
ticle 12, which affords children the right to be substan-
tively heard by administrative and judicial bodies, as chil-
dren. Section 9a affords children this right within the
school environment.
What does this decision say about voice and legal
agency? Only that, again, it is as an adult that the com-
plainant is able to be heard, in addition to the marked
absence of any references to the right of the child to be
heard in bullying cases. Reference is made by the Court
to Article 29 (1) CRC on Article 29 (1) that stipulates the
right to a learning environment without tolerance for
bullying, but the decision is thereby not formulated in
terms of the right of the child to be heard. However, we
may not want to throw the towel in just yet. The Kris-
tiansand decision provides indirectly for the need to hear
children who complain about bullying through adequate
complaintmechanisms at the school and the local county
level. Though this case is not an Article 12 case, indeed
the only article from the CRC that is cited is Article 29(1),
it can be read through an Article 12 lens. Namely, the
school’s repeated failure to act, in addition to the Court’s
reasoning as to why its chosen course of action was in-
correct, sheds light upon how the student was not heard
in practice.
6. Conclusion
The voices of children subjected to bullying in schools
have not been heard; though the law in Section 9a pro-
vides for some form of agency, it has been grossly under-
used by children. This may speak to the cultural bedrock
of childhood disabilities which is proving difficult to shift.
Nonetheless, the existence of such a law could be seen as
a promising step in the right direction signalling a devel-
oping law of legal agency for children in Norway who are
subjected to bullying. Yet, the Government’s law reform
post-Djupedal leads to some uncertainty. In its response
to the Djupedal Report, the Government announced its
new measures to combat bullying in school in Circular
dated 18 April 2016, in three areas: competence, sup-
port and guidance and legislative change. The Report’s
recommendations adopted with regard to a better com-
plaint procedure were limited to a “clearer action obli-
gation” in Section 9a; a “strengthened right of appeal”;
and “strengthened pupils’ rights”. Read in light of the
new revised Section 9a, these changes run the risk—at
best—of being cosmetic (as opposed to the substantive
changes proposed by the Report), re-wording the current
text in line with the current mechanisms for complaint,
indicated further by the right of appeal to the County
Governor remaining the same. No suggestion was made
of the direct reference to the guiding principles of the
CRC. More cynically, according to the legal expert on the
Djupedal Committee, Tor Kjelland, and a lawyer admitted
to the Supreme Court specialising in employment cases
and bullying, the most recent amendment to the Educa-
tion Act, Section 9a is a drastic and unfortunate retro-
gressive step for the individual rights of children (Flad-
berg, 2017). Thus, one is led to summarily conclude that
children who are bullied in Norway have in practice had
little voice, though it exists in legislation. Further, given
the recent amendments to the Education Act, the provi-
sion of legal voice may seem like a receding legal possi-
bility still. Interpreting the Government’s new changes in
light of the political discussion on ratification of OP3 CRC
leads one to surmise that OP3 CRC ratification may help
to revisit domestic complaints procedures available to
children in Norway. Ratification of this instrument would
necessitate more substantive changes in complaints pro-
cedures for children in order to make them more effec-
tive, failing which, the child could complain directly to
the CRC Committee.
The limited measures adopted, viewed through the
lens of Norwegian non-ratification of OP3 CRC, illustrate
ratification would thus not only signal a positive—even
if only symbolic—attestation to the principles contained
in the child’s right to be heard, it would also strenghten
the domestic complaint procedures available to children
subjected to bullying in Norway. In its national report
submitted to the Human Rights Council for the Universal
Periodic Review, the Norwegian government specified
one of its national priorities as being to “Consider rati-
fication of the optional protocols on establishing an in-
dividual complaints mechanism for the…UN Convention
on the Rights of the Child” (National report submitted
in accordance with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human
Rights Council resolution 16/21, 2014, para. 116). In the
Review, the Human Rights Council made the formal rec-
ommendations that Norway consider becoming a party
to, and to “accelerate the process of ratification” of OP3
CRC (National report submitted in accordance with para-
graph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution
16/21, 2014, para. 131). However, in 2016 the Norwe-
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gian government unequivocally stated it will not give chil-
dren the right to appeal to the UN. The argument was
a political one, arguing “that it is highly uncertain what
consequences the schemes may have for Norway’s polit-
ical manoeuvre” as argued by Foreign Minister Brende
(“The government will not give children the right to ap-
peal to the UN,” 2016), thereby crystallising decades of
arguments being made in Norway on democratic legiti-
macy. Though presenting itself as a pioneer in children’s
rights, Norwegian government measures to combat bul-
lying read in tandem with non-ratification of OP3 CRC of-
fer an example of the lip service granted to child rights
(by adults) without affording concrete complaint rights
to children—thereby failing to take seriously the right of
the child to be heard—as per Article 12.
OP3 CRCmaterialises Article 12(2) of the CRC, though
it was not expressed in these terms during the drafting
process in the Working Group Sessions in Geneva. By ex-
pressly rejecting ratification of this new instrument, the
Norwegian government has in effect demonstrated its
lack of commitment to Article 12(2) of the CRC and the le-
gal agency of children. This is supported by the argument
advanced here, that themost recent amendments to the
Education Act Section 9a, are a step backwards for the
legal agency of children. Thus, ratification would send a
positive signal by the Norwegian government, thereby
taking a step towards fulfilling one of the purposes of in-
corporation of the CRC, by realising the rights mandated
by Article 12.
This article has argued for the forging of the connec-
tion between a child’s voice and agency: that, where it
was implicit, it can now be seen to be an express right
of children in international human rights law. This ar-
gument is no more radical than a reading of Article 12
as granting child participation rights, rights which “have
been held up as the most radical and controversial con-
tribution of the UNCRC” (Tisdall, 2015, p. 196). Anti-
bullying efforts in Norway have been pioneering, but
children’s voices are still not being heard. Studies have
shown the delay in the processing of bullying complaints,
the extremely low rates of Section 9a decisions rendered
by schools and the low usage of appeals to the County
Governors, all of which are confirmed by the Djupedal
Report. As we have seen here, they are also reflected
in the informal complaints submitted by children to the
Ombudsman for Children, especially in the cases where
these children’s bullying complaints are not formally reg-
istered by the school system, and are therefore invisi-
ble. The Ombudsman for Children’s lack of a mandate
to hear cases results in these children often being given
formulaic responses, referring them to the County Gov-
ernor, to the police, or back to their schools. The chil-
dren are speaking, but they are not being heard in a way
that would satisfy Article 12. Thus, in Norway, we are
currently witnessing what can be called the “voice-over”
effect, which operates as a barrier that prevents chil-
dren from having voice and agency. This “voice-over” is
to be distinguished from voicelessness in a recognisable
way: children are publicly afforded the right to speak,
and Norway is seen to be effective in its implementa-
tion of Article 12 and the child’s right to be heard in mat-
ters that affect her. Rather, children are not being heard
and yet they appear to have voice. The child’s voice is
not being substantively heard by the schools or through
the lengthy appeals procedure to the County Governor.
The Djupedal Report proposes substantive reform to Sec-
tion 9a in order to realise Article 12, but to date, these
have not been adopted by the Government in Prop. 57 L
the revised law that entered into force 1 August 2017.
The voice is thus a voice-over by decision-makers: adults
in positions of political and social power claim that chil-
dren have the right to be heard, whereas, to the contrary,
children’s complaints are in substance not being heard.
This political disenfranchisement of children in ad-
dition to their legal disabilities in claiming violations of
their human rights magnifies the impenetrability of their
voices through these double soundproofing layers. They
are not silent, but are silenced, and are presided over
by the voice-over of adult narrators: either the adult sur-
vivors of childhood violations themselves, or by adults
in positions of authority, such as teachers, guardians,
school principals, politicians, judges or the like.
Norway has been hailed as norm entrepreneur in
world politics in human rights and anti-bullying efforts
and sees itself as a leader in child rights protection. How-
ever, recent debates surrounding the OP3 CRC and the
unwillingness of the executive to ratify signal a palpable
sea change. Norway advances a number of political ar-
guments as to non-ratification of OP3 CRC, not least of
which is the democratic legitimacy debate. Yet, this arti-
cle suggests that non-ratification can be seen rather to
be more consistent with domestic practice of not grant-
ing legal agency to children, thereby not satisfying one
of the central pillars of the CRC—the child’s right to be
heard. This can be explained in terms of the unshakeable
quality of childhood legal disabilities—even in Norway—
where children are in effect denied legal agency through
their inability to complain about rights abuses as per Ar-
ticle 12.
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